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In this paper, we study Ramsey-optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in a medium-
scale model of the U.S. business cycle. The model features a rich array of real and
nominal rigidities that have been identiﬁed in the recent empirical literature as salient
in explaining observed aggregate ﬂuctuations. The main result of the paper is that
price stability appears to be a central goal of optimal monetary policy. The optimal
rate of inﬂation under an income tax regime is half a percent per year with a volatility
of 1.1 percent. This result is surprising given that the model features a number of
frictions that in isolation would call for a volatile rate of inﬂation—particularly non-
state-contingent nominal public debt, no lump-sum taxes, and sticky wages. Under
an income-tax regime, the optimal income tax rate is quite stable, with a mean of
30 percent and a standard deviation of 1.1 percent. JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E61,
E63. Keywords: Ramsey Policy, Inﬂation Stabilization, Tax Smoothing, Time to Tax,
Nominal and Real Rigidities.
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This paper addresses a classic question in macroeconomics, namely, how should a benevolent
government conduct stabilization policy. A central characteristic of all existing studies is
that optimal policy is derived in highly stylized environments. Typically, optimal policy
is characterized for economies with a single or a very small number of deviations from the
frictionless neoclassical paradigm. A case in point are the numerous recent studies concerned
with optimal monetary policy within the context of the two-equation, one-friction, neo-
Keynesian model without capital accumulation. An advantage of this stylized approach
to optimal stabilization policy is that it facilitates understanding the ways in which policy
should respond to mitigate the distortionary eﬀects of a particular friction in isolation.
An important drawback of studying optimal stabilization policy one distortion at a time
is that highly simpliﬁed models are unlikely to provide a satisfactory account of cyclical
movements for more than just a few macroeconomic variables of interest. For this reason,
the usefulness of this strategy to produce policy advice for the real world is necessarily
limited.
The approach to optimal policy that we propose in this paper departs from the literature
extant in that it is based on a rich medium-scale theoretical framework capable of explaining
observed business cycle ﬂuctuations for a wide range of nominal and real variables. Following
the lead of Kimball (1995), the model emphasizes the importance of combining nominal as
well as real rigidities in explaining the propagation of macroeconomic shocks. Speciﬁcally,
the model features four nominal frictions, sticky prices, sticky wages, a demand for money
by households, and a cash-in-advance constraint on the wage bill of ﬁrms, and ﬁve sources
of real rigidities, investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, habit formation,
imperfect competition in product and factor markets, and distortionary taxation. Aggregate
ﬂuctuations are assumed to be driven by supply shocks, which take the form of stochastic
variations in total factor productivity, and demand shocks stemming from exogenous inno-
vations to the level of government purchases and the level of government transfers. Altig et
al. (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) argue that the model economy for
which we seek to design optimal policy can indeed explain the observed responses of inﬂation,
real wages, nominal interest rates, money growth, output, investment, consumption, labor
productivity, and real proﬁts to productivity and monetary shocks in the postwar United
States. In this respect, the present paper aspires to be a step ahead in the research program
of generating policy evaluation that is of relevance for actual policy making.
The government is assumed to be benevolent in the Ramsey sense, that is, it seeks to bring
about the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the lifetime utility of the representative
agent and has access to a commitment technology that allows it to honor its promises. The
policy instruments available to the government are assumed to be taxes on income, possibly,
diﬀerentiated across diﬀerent sources of income, and the short-term nominal interest rate.
Public debt is assumed to be nominal and non-state contingent.
A key ﬁnding of the paper is that price stability appears to be a central goal of optimal
monetary policy. The optimal rate of inﬂation under an income tax regime is 0.5 percent per
year with a volatility of 1.1 percent. In this sense, price stickiness emerges as the single most
important distortion shaping optimal policy. This result is surprising given that the model
features a number of other frictions that in isolation would call for a volatile rate of inﬂation
5
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contingent and that regular taxes are distortionary, makes it attractive for the Ramsey
planner to use unexpected variations in inﬂation as a lump-sum tax on private holdings of
nominal government liabilities. This is indeed the reason why in ﬂexible price environments
the optimal inﬂation volatility is very high (see, for example, Calvo and Guidotti, 1990,
1993; and Chari et al. 1991). Second, the fact that nominal wages are sticky provides an
incentive for the government to set the price level so as to engineer the eﬃcient real wage.
This practice, when studied in isolation, also makes high inﬂation volatility optimal.
When the ﬁscal authority is allowed to tax capital and labor income at diﬀerent rates,
optimal ﬁscal policy is characterized by a large and volatile subsidy on capital. It is well
known from the work of Judd (2002) that in the presence of imperfect competition in product
markets optimal taxation calls for a subsidy on capital of a magnitude approximately equal
to the markup of prices over marginal cost. However, our results suggest that the optimal
capital subsidy is much larger than the one identiﬁed in the work of Judd. The reason for
this discrepancy is that capital depreciation in combination with a depreciation allowance,
which is ignored in the work of Judd, exacerbates the need to subsidize capital. This is
because the markup distorts the gross rate of return on capital whereas the subsidy applies
to the return on capital net of depreciation.
Ramsey outcomes are mute on the issue of what policy regimes can implement them.
The information on policy one can extract from the solution to the Ramsey problem is
limited to the equilibrium behavior of policy variables such as tax rates, the nominal interest
rate, etc. as a function of the state of the economy. Even if the policymaker could observe
the state of the economy, using the equilibrium process of the policy variables to deﬁne
a policy regime would not guarantee the Ramsey outcome as the competitive equilibrium.
The problem is that such a policy regime could give rise to multiple equilibria. We address
the issue of implementation of optimal policy by limiting attention to simple monetary and
ﬁscal rules. These rules are deﬁned over a small set of readily available macro indicators and
are designed to ensure local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. We ﬁnd
parameterizations of such policy rules capable of inducing equilibrium dynamics fairly close
to those associated with the Ramsey equilibrium.
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 612
April 20061 Introduction
This paper addresses a classic question in macroeconomics, namely, how should a benevolent
government conduct stabilization policy. A central characteristic of all existing studies is
that optimal policy is derived in highly stylized environments. Typically, optimal policy
is characterized for economies with a single or a very small number of deviations from the
frictionless neoclassical paradigm. A case in point are the numerous recent studies concerned
with optimal monetary policy within the context of the two-equation, one-friction, neo-
Keynesian model without capital accumulation.1 Another example of studies in which the
optimal policy design problem is analyzed within theoretical frameworks featuring a small
number of rigidities include models with ﬂexible prices and distorting income taxes (Lucas
and Stokey, 1983; Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004b). An advantage of this stylized approach
to optimal stabilization policy is that it facilitates understanding the ways in which policy
should respond to mitigate the distortionary eﬀects of a particular friction in isolation.
An important drawback of studying optimal stabilization policy one distortion at a time
is that highly simpliﬁed models are unlikely to provide a satisfactory account of cyclical
movements for more than just a few macroeconomic variables of interest. For this reason,
the usefulness of this strategy to produce policy advice for the real world is necessarily
limited.
The approach to optimal policy that we propose in this paper departs from the literature
extant in that it is based on a rich medium-scale theoretical framework capable of explaining
observed business cycle ﬂuctuations for a wide range of nominal and real variables. Following
the lead of Kimball (1995), the model emphasizes the importance of combining nominal as
well as real rigidities in explaining the propagation of macroeconomic shocks. Speciﬁcally,
the model features four nominal frictions, sticky prices, sticky wages, a demand for money
by households, and a cash-in-advance constraint on the wage bill of ﬁrms, and ﬁve sources
of real rigidities, investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, habit formation,
imperfect competition in product and factor markets, and distortionary taxation. Aggregate
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April 2006ﬂuctuations are assumed to be driven by supply shocks, which take the form of stochastic
variations in total factor productivity, and demand shocks stemming from exogenous inno-
vations to the level of government purchases and the level of government transfers. Altig et
al. (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) argue that the model economy for
which we seek to design optimal policy can indeed explain the observed responses of inﬂation,
real wages, nominal interest rates, money growth, output, investment, consumption, labor
productivity, and real proﬁts to productivity and monetary shocks in the postwar United
States. In this respect, the present paper aspires to be a step ahead in the research program
of generating policy evaluation that is of relevance for actual policy making.
The government is assumed to be benevolent in the Ramsey sense, that is, it seeks to bring
about the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the lifetime utility of the representative
agent and has access to a commitment technology that allows it to honor its promises. The
policy instruments available to the government are assumed to be taxes on income, possibly,
diﬀerentiated across diﬀerent sources of income, and the short-term nominal interest rate.
Public debt is assumed to be nominal and non-state contingent.
A key ﬁnding of the paper is that price stability appears to be a central goal of optimal
monetary policy. The optimal rate of inﬂation under an income tax regime is 0.5 percent
per year with a volatility of 1.1 percent. In this sense, price stickiness emerges as the single
most important distortion shaping optimal policy. This result is surprising given that the
model features a number of other frictions that in isolation would call for a volatile rate of
inﬂation with a mean diﬀerent from zero.
Consider ﬁrst the forces calling for an optimal inﬂation rate that is diﬀerent from zero.
As is well known, the presence of a demand for money by households provides an incentive to
drive inﬂation down to a level consistent with the Friedman rule. In this paper, we identify
two additional reasons why the Ramsey planner may want to deviate from price stability.
First, under an income tax regime, i.e., when all sources of income are taxed at the same
rate, the Ramsey planner has an inﬂationary bias originating from the fact that it is less
8
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constraint on the wage bill of ﬁrms, inﬂation acts as a tax on labor income. Second, the
Ramsey planner has an incentive to tax away transfers as they represent pure rents accruing
to households. Without a direct instruments to tax transfers, the government imposes an
indirect levy on this source of household income via the inﬂation tax.
Optimal policy calls for low inﬂation volatility in spite of the following two distortions
that by themselves call for high inﬂation volatility. First, the fact that nominal government
debt is non-state contingent and that regular taxes are distortionary, makes it attractive
for the Ramsey planner to use unexpected variations in inﬂation as a lump-sum tax on
private holdings of nominal government liabilities. This is indeed the reason why in ﬂexible
price environments the optimal inﬂation volatility is very high (see, for example, Calvo and
Guidotti, 1990, 1993; and Chari et al. 1991). Second, the fact that nominal wages are sticky
provides an incentive for the government to set the price level so as to engineer the eﬃcient
real wage. This practice, when studied in isolation, also makes high inﬂation volatility
optimal.
When the ﬁscal authority is allowed to tax capital and labor income at diﬀerent rates,
optimal ﬁscal policy is characterized by a large and volatile subsidy on capital. It is well
known from the work of Judd (2002) that in the presence of imperfect competition in product
markets optimal taxation calls for a subsidy on capital of a magnitude approximately equal
to the markup of prices over marginal cost. However, our results suggest that the optimal
capital subsidy is much larger than the one identiﬁed in the work of Judd. The reason for
this discrepancy is that capital depreciation in combination with a depreciation allowance,
which is ignored in the work of Judd, exacerbates the need to subsidize capital. This is
because the markup distorts the gross rate of return on capital whereas the subsidy applies
to the return on capital net of depreciation.
In our model, the optimal capital subsidy is extremely volatile. Its standard deviation is
150 percent. The high volatility of capital income taxes emerges for the familiar reason that
9
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changes in the capital income tax rate as a shock absorber for innovations in its budget (see,
for example, Judd, 1992). We identify two frictions capable of driving this high volatility
down signiﬁcantly. One is time to tax. When tax rates are determined four quarters in
advance, the optimal volatility of the capital income tax rate falls to about 50 percent. This
is because the tax elasticity of the demand for capital increases with the number of periods
between the announcement of the tax rate and its application. The second friction that
is important in understanding the volatility of capital taxes is investment adjustment cost.
Intuitively, the higher are the impediments to adjust the level of investment, the lower is
the elasticity of capital with respect to temporary changes in tax rates. In the absence of
investment adjustment costs, the optimal volatility of the capital income tax rate falls to
65 percent. Furthermore, in an environment with 4 periods of time to tax and no capital
adjustment cost, the optimal capital income tax has a volatility of 25 percent.
Ramsey outcomes are mute on the issue of what policy regimes can implement them.
The information on policy one can extract from the solution to the Ramsey problem is
limited to the equilibrium behavior of policy variables such as tax rates, the nominal interest
rate, etc. as a function of the state of the economy. Even if the policymaker could observe
the state of the economy, using the equilibrium process of the policy variables to deﬁne
a policy regime would not guarantee the Ramsey outcome as the competitive equilibrium.
The problem is that such a policy regime could give rise to multiple equilibria. We address
the issue of implementation of optimal policy by limiting attention to simple monetary and
ﬁscal rules. These rules are deﬁned over a small set of readily available macro indicators and
are designed to ensure local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. We ﬁnd
parameterizations of such policy rules capable of inducing equilibrium dynamics fairly close
to those associated with the Ramsey equilibrium.
Finally, a methodological contribution of this paper is the development of a set of nu-
merical tools that allow the computation of Ramsey policy in a general class of stochastic
10
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licly available at the authors’ websites.
The remainder of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model and its calibration. Section 3 characterizes the Ramsey steady state. Section 4 studies
the Ramsey dynamics in an economy where the ﬁscal authority is constrained to taxing all
sources of income at the same rate. Section 5 identiﬁes simple interest-rate and tax rules
capable of mimicking well the Ramsey equilibrium dynamics. Section 6 studies the Ramsey
problem in an economy in which capital and labor can be taxed at diﬀerent rates. This
section also analyzes the consequences of time to tax. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The essential elements of the model economy that serves as the basis for our study of stabi-
lization policy are taken from a recent paper by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
This model and variations thereof have been estimated by a number of authors in past couple
of years. The structure of the model is the standard neoclassical growth model augmented
with a number of real and nominal frictions. The nominal frictions are sticky prices, sticky
wages, a money demand by households, and a money demand by ﬁrms. The real frictions
consist of monopolistic competition in product and factor markets, habit formation, invest-
ment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, and distortionary taxation.
We keep the description of the model brief and refer the reader to the expanded version
of this paper (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2005b) for a more detailed exposition.
2.1 The Private Sector
The economy is assumed to be populated by a large representative family with a continuum
of members. Consumption and hours worked are identical across family members. The
household’s preferences are deﬁned over per capita consumption, ct, and per capita labor
11
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where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able at time t, β ∈ (0,1) represents a subjective discount factor, and φ3 > 0 and φ4 ∈ (0,1)
are parameters. Preferences display internal habit formation, measured by the parameter
b ∈ [0,1). The consumption good is assumed to be a composite made of a continuum of








where the parameter η>1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across diﬀer-
ent varieties of consumption goods.
For any given level of consumption of the composite good, purchases of each individual
variety of goods i ∈ [0,1] in period t must solve the dual problem of minimizing total
expenditure,
R 1
0 Pitcitdi, subject to the aggregation constraint (1), where Pit denotes the


















This price index has the property that the minimum cost of a bundle of intermediate goods
yielding ct units of the composite good is given by Ptct.
Labor decisions are made by a central authority within the household, a union, which
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 612
April 2006supplies labor monopolistically to a continuum of labor markets of measure 1 indexed by










t denotes the nominal wage charged by the union in labor market j at time t, Wt is
an index of nominal wages prevailing in the economy, and hd
t is a measure of aggregate labor
demand by ﬁrms. In each particular labor market, the union takes Wt and hd
t as exogenous.
The case in which the union takes aggregate labor variables as endogenous can be interpreted
as an environment with highly centralized labor unions. Higher-level labor organizations play
an important role in some European and Latin American countries, but are less prominent
in the United States. Given the wage charged in each labor market j ∈ [0,1], the union is
assumed to supply enough labor, h
j

















t /Pt and wt ≡ Wt/Pt. In addition, the total number of hours allocated to


















Our setup of imperfectly competitive labor markets departs from most existing expositions
of models with nominal wage inertia. For in these models, it is assumed that each house-
hold supplies a diﬀerentiated type of labor input. This assumption introduces equilibrium
heterogeneity across households in the number of hours worked. To avoid this heterogeneity
from spilling over into consumption heterogeneity, it is typically assumed that preferences
are separable in consumption and hours and that ﬁnancial markets exist that allow agents to
fully insure against employment risk. Our formulation has the advantage that it avoids the
need to assume both separability of preferences in leisure and consumption and the existence
13
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rise to a wage-inﬂation Phillips curve with a larger coeﬃcient on the wage-markup gap that
the model with employment heterogeneity across households.
The household is assumed to own physical capital, kt, which accumulates according to
the following law of motion











where it denotes gross investment and δ is a parameter denoting the rate of depreciation of
physical capital. The process of capital accumulation is subject to investment adjustment
costs. These assumed functional form for the adjustment-cost function implies that up to
ﬁrst order adjustment costs are nil in the vicinity of the deterministic steady state. The
parameter κ is positive.
Owners of physical capital can control the intensity at which this factor is utilized. For-
mally, we let ut measure capacity utilization in period t. We assume that using the stock of
capital with intensity ut entails a cost of [γ1(ut −1)+γ2/2(ut −1)2]kt units of the composite
ﬁnal good. The parameters γ1 and γ2 take on positive values. Both the speciﬁcation of cap-
ital adjustment costs and capacity utilization costs are somewhat peculiar. More standard
formulations assume that adjustment costs depend on the level of investment rather than
on its growth rate, as is assumed here. Also, costs of capacity utilization typically take the
form of a higher rate of depreciation of physical capital. The modeling choice here is guided
by the need to ﬁt the response of investment and capacity utilization to a monetary shock
in the US economy. For further discussion of this point, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005, section 6.1) and Altig et al. (2004).
Households rent the capital stock to ﬁrms at the real rental rate rk
t per unit of capital.
Thus, total income stemming from the rental of capital is given by rk
t utkt. The investment
good is assumed to be a composite good made with the aggregator function (1). Thus,
14
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iit = it (Pit/Pt)
−η .
As in earlier related work (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004a) and Altig et al. (2004), we
motivate a demand for money by households by assuming that purchases of consumption are
subject to a proportional transaction cost that is increasing in consumption based money








is the ratio of consumption to real money balances held by the household, which we denote
by mh
t . The functional form assumed for the transaction cost technology ensures that the
Friedman rule, i.e., a zero nominal interest rate, need not be associated with an inﬁnite
demand for money. It also implies that both the transaction cost and the distortion it
introduces vanish when the nominal interest rate is zero. The transaction cost function also
guarantees that in equilibrium money velocity is always greater than or equal to a satiation
level given by
p
φ2/φ1. Our speciﬁcation of the transaction technology ensures that the
demand for money is decreasing in the nominal interest rate.
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nominal state-contingent
assets. Speciﬁcally, each period t ≥ 0, consumers can purchase any desired state-contingent
nominal payment Xh
t+1 in period t + 1 at the dollar cost Etrt,t+1Xh
t+1. The variable rt,t+1
denotes a stochastic nominal discount factor between periods t and t + 1. Households must
pay taxes on labor income, capital income, and proﬁts. We denote by τh
t , τk
t , and τ
φ
t ,
respectively, the labor income tax rate, the capital income tax rate, and the proﬁt tax rate
in period t. A tax allowance is assumed to apply to costs due to depreciation. Households
receive real lump-sum transfers from the government in the amount nt per period. The
15
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t /πt ≡ Xh
t /Pt denotes the real payoﬀ in period t of nominal state-contingent
assets purchased in period t − 1. The variable φt denotes dividends received from the own-
ership of ﬁrms, qt denotes the price of capital in terms of consumption, and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1
denotes the gross rate of consumer-price inﬂation.
We introduce wage stickiness in the model by assuming that each period the household
(or union) cannot set the nominal wage optimally in a fraction ˜ α ∈ [0,1) of randomly chosen
labor markets. In these markets, the wage rate is indexed to the previous period’s consumer-






t−1, where ˜ χ is a parameter measuring the
degree of wage indexation. When ˜ χ equals 0, there is no wage indexation. When ˜ χ equals
1, there is full wage indexation to past consumer price inﬂation. In general, ˜ χ can take any
value between 0 and 1.
Each variety of ﬁnal goods is produced by a single ﬁrm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1] produces output using as factor inputs capital services, kit,






where the parameter θ lies between 0 and 1. The variable zt denotes an aggregate, exogenous,
and stochastic productivity shock whose law of motion is given by
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t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero, standard deviation σ￿z,
and bounded support. The parameter ψ>0 introduces ﬁxed costs of operating a ﬁrm in
each period. It implies that the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. We
model ﬁxed costs to ensure a realistic proﬁt-to-output ratio in steady state.










+ it + gt +[ γ1(ut − 1) + γ2/2(ut − 1)
2]kt,
denotes aggregate absorption. The variable gt denotes government consumption of the com-
posite good in period t.
We rationalize a demand for money by ﬁrms by imposing that wage payments be subject






it denotes the demand for real money balances by ﬁrm i in period t and ν ≥ 0
is a parameter indicating the fraction of the wage bill that must be backed with monetary
assets. The presence of a working-capital requirement introduces a ﬁnancial cost of labor
that is increasing in the nominal interest rate. We note also that because all ﬁrms face the
same factor prices and because they all have access to the same production technology that
is linearly homogeneous up to a constant term, marginal costs are identical across ﬁrms.
Prices are assumed to be sticky ` a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Speciﬁcally, each
period t ≥ 0 a fraction α ∈ [0,1) of randomly picked ﬁrms is not allowed to optimally set
the nominal price of the good they produce. Instead, these ﬁrms index their prices to past
17
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χ
t−1. The interpretation of the parameter χ is the
same as that of its wage counterpart ˜ χ. The remaining 1 − α ﬁrms choose prices optimally.
2.2 The Government
Each period, the government consumes gt units of the composite good. We assume that the
variable gt is exogenous and that its logarithm follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process of
the form
ln(gt/¯ g)=ρg ln(gt−1/¯ g)+￿
g
t,
where ρg ∈ (−1,1) and ¯ g>0 are parameters, and ￿
g
t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero,
standard deviation σ￿g, and bounded support. The parameter ¯ g represents the nonstochastic
steady-state level of government absorption. We assume that the government minimizes the
cost of producing gt. As a result, public demand for each variety i ∈ [0,1] of diﬀerentiated
goods git is given by git =( Pit/Pt)−ηgt. A second source of government expenditures are
transfer payments to households in the amount nt, measured in units of the composite good.
Like government consumption, transfers are assumed to be exogenous and to follow the law
of motion
ln(nt/¯ n)=ρn ln(nt−1/¯ n)+￿
n
t ,
where ρn ∈ (−1,1) and ¯ n>0 are parameters, and ￿n
t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero,
standard deviation σ￿n, and bounded support. The parameter ¯ n represents the nonstochastic
steady-state level of government transfers.
The government levies labor, capital, and proﬁt income taxes. It grants allowances for
the costs of depreciation and variations in capacity utilization. Total tax revenues are then






t φt. The government issues money given in





itdi. The ﬁscal authority covers deﬁcits by issuing one-period,
nominally risk-free bonds, Bt. The period-by-period budget constraint of the consolidated
government is then given by bt − (Rt−1/πt)bt−1 + mt − mt−1/πt = gt + nt − τt. Letting
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at
Rt





+ gt + nt.
We assume that at time 0 the benevolent government has been operating for an inﬁnite
number of periods. In choosing optimal policy, the government is assumed to honor commit-
ments made in the past. This form of policy commitment has been referred to as ‘optimal
from the timeless perspective’ (Woodford, 2003).
A Ramsey equilibrium is deﬁned as the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the
lifetime utility of the representative agent. Technically, the diﬀerence between the usual
Ramsey equilibrium concept and the one employed here is that here the structure of the
optimality conditions associated with the Ramsey equilibrium is time invariant. By contrast,
under the standard Ramsey equilibrium deﬁnition, the equilibrium conditions in the initial
periods are diﬀerent from those applying to later periods.
Our results concerning the business-cycle properties of Ramsey-optimal policy are com-
parable to those obtained in the existing literature under the standard deﬁnition of Ramsey
optimality (e.g., Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1995). The reason is that existing studies of
business cycles under the standard Ramsey policy focus on the behavior of the economy in
the stochastic steady state (i.e., they limit attention to the properties of equilibrium time
series excluding the initial transition).
2.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency. Most of the parameter values are taken
from the empirical work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Altig et al.
(2004). These papers estimate the structural parameters of the model presented in the
previous section using postwar U.S. data. A notable exception to this rule is the calibration
of the degree of indexation in product prices and wages. The reason is that in those papers
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full indexation of all prices to past product price inﬂation. Instead, we draw from the
econometric work of Cogley and Sbordone (2004) and Levin et al. (2005) who ﬁnd no evidence
of indexation in product prices. We therefore set χ =0 . At the same time, Levin et al.
estimate a high degree of indexation in nominal wages. We therefore assume that ˜ χ =1 .
Table 1 gathers the values of the deep structural parameters of the model implied by our
calibration strategy.
A more detailed description of this strategy is contained in the expanded version of this
paper (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2005b).
3 The Ramsey Steady State
Consider the long-run state of the Ramsey equilibrium in an economy without uncertainty.
We refer to this state as the Ramsey steady state. Note that the Ramsey steady state is in
general diﬀerent from the allocation/policy that maximizes welfare in the steady state of a
competitive equilibrium.
Table 2 displays the Ramsey steady-state values of inﬂation, the nominal interest rate,
and labor and capital income tax rates under a number of environments of interests.
The ﬁgures reported in the table correspond to the exact numerical solution to the steady-
state of the Ramsey problem.
3.1 The Optimal Level of Inﬂation




t for all t). In this case, the Ramsey planner chooses to conduct monetary policy
in such a way as to nearly stabilize the price level. The optimal inﬂation rate is 18 basis
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inﬂation rate is positive. This ﬁnding is somewhat surprising, for a well-known result in
the context of simpler versions of the new Keynesian model is that the Ramsey steady-state
level of inﬂation is negative and lies between the one called for by the Friedman rule and the
one corresponding to full price stabilization. In calibrated example economies, the optimal
deﬂation rate is, however, small (see, for instance, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004a; and
Khan, et al., 2003). In these simpler models the optimal inﬂation rate is determined by the
tradeoﬀ between minimizing the opportunity cost of holding money (which requires setting
the inﬂation rate equal to minus the real interest rate) and minimizing price dispersion
arising from nominal rigidities (which requires setting inﬂation at zero). Clearly, our ﬁnding
of a positive inﬂation rate suggests that in the medium-scale economy we study in this paper
there must be an additional tradeoﬀ that the Ramsey planner faces in setting the rate of
inﬂation. To make the presence of the third tradeoﬀ nitid, we consider the case of indexation
of product prices to lagged inﬂation, χ = 1 (line 2 of table 2). In this case, the long-run
distortions stemming from nominal rigidities are nil. (Recall that in our calibration nominal
wages are fully indexed, i.e., ˜ χ = 1.) Therefore, in this case there is no tradeoﬀ between
the sticky-price and money-demand frictions. In the absence of any additional tradeoﬀs, one
should expect the Friedman rule to be optimal in this case. However, line 2 of table 2 shows
that under long-run price ﬂexibility, the optimal rate of inﬂation is 4.6 percent per year, a
value even further removed from the Friedman rule than the one that is optimal under no
indexation in product markets (line 1 of table 2).
The third tradeoﬀ turns out to originate in the presence of government transfer payments
to households, nt. Line 3 of table 2 shows that under full indexation and in the absence of
government transfers, the Friedman rule emerges as the optimal monetary policy. That is,
the nominal interest rate is zero and the inﬂation rate is negative and equal to the rate of
discount in absolute value. The reason why lump-sum government transfers induce positive
inﬂation is that from the viewpoint of the Ramsey planner they represent pure rents accruing
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speciﬁc instrument to tax transfer income, the government chooses to tax this source of
income indirectly when it is used for consumption. Speciﬁcally, in the model consumption
purchases require money. As a result, a positive opportunity cost of holding money—i.e., a
positive nominal interest rate—acts as a tax on consumption.2
Clearly, in the present model, if lump-sum transfers could be set optimally, they would
be set at a negative value in a magnitude suﬃcient to ﬁnance government expenditures
and output subsidies aimed at eliminating monopolistic distortions in product and factor
markets. But in reality government transfers are positive and large. In the United States,
they averaged 7 percent of GDP in the postwar era. Justifying this amount of government
transfers as an optimal outcome lies beyond the scope of this paper. One obvious theoretical
element that would introduce a rationale for positive government transfers would be the
introduction of some form of heterogeneity across households.
Whether set optimally or not, government transfers must be ﬁnanced. Comparing lines
1 and 4 of table 2 it follows that the government must increase the labor income tax rate by
12 percentage points to ﬁnance transfer payments of 7 percent of GDP. Thus, the economy
featuring transfers is signiﬁcantly more distorted than the one without transfers. Because, in
general, optimal stabilization policy will depend on the average level of distortion present in
the economy, it is of importance for the purpose of this paper to explicitly include transfers
into the model. It is noteworthy that under the calibration shown in table 1 (particularly,
under no indexation), allowing for transfers has virtually no eﬀect on the steady-state Ramsey
policy except for the level of the labor income tax rate. Speciﬁcally, comparing lines 1 and
4 of table 2 shows that removing transfers has virtually no bearing on the optimal rate of
inﬂation and capital income taxation in the steady state.
We conclude that the tripodal tradeoﬀ that determines the Ramsey long-run rate of
inﬂation is resolved in favor of price stability. In this sense, the nominal price friction
appears to dominate the money demand friction and the transfer-taxation motive in shaping
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optimal monetary policy in the long run.3.2 Optimal Tax Rates
Consider ﬁrst the economy where proﬁt income are taxed at 100 percent (τ
φ
t = 1). In this
case, shown in line 5 of table 2, the Ramsey plan calls for subsidizing capital at the rate of
44.3 percent in the deterministic steady state. It is well known from the work of Judd (2002)
that in the presence of imperfect competition in product markets, the markup of prices over
marginal costs introduces a distortion between the private and the social returns to capital
that increases exponentially over the investment horizon. As a result, optimal policy calls
for eliminating this distortion by setting negative capital income tax rates. To gain insight
into the nature of the capital income subsidy, note that in steady state the private return
to investment is given by (1 − τk)(uFk/µ − δ − a(u)), where µ denotes the steady-state
markup, uFk denotes the marginal product of capital, δ denotes the depreciation rate, and
a(u) denotes the cost of utilizing capital at the rate u. The social return to capital is given
by uFk −δ −a(u). Equating the private and social returns to investment requires setting τk
so that
(1 − τ
k)(uFk/µ − δ − a(u)) = uFk − δ − a(u).
Because in the presence of market power in product markets, the markup is greater than
unity (µ>1), it follows that τk must be negative. Using the fact that in the steady state





β−1 − 1 − (µ − 1)(δ + a(u))
￿
. (3)
It is clear from this expression that if the depreciation rate is zero (δ=0), and capacity
utilization is ﬁxed at unity (so that a(u) = 0), then the optimal capital income tax rate
is equal to the net markup in absolute value. The case of zero depreciation and constant
capacity utilization is the one considered in Judd (2002).3 We ﬁnd that the introduction
23
ECB
Working Paper Series No 612
April 2006of depreciation in combination with a depreciation allowance, which is clearly the case of
greatest empirical interest, magniﬁes signiﬁcantly the size of the optimal capital subsidy.
For instance, in our economy the markup is 20 percent, the depreciation rate is 7 percent
per year, and the discount factor is 4 percent per year. In the case of no depreciation and
ﬁxed capacity utilization, the formula in equation (3) implies a capital subsidy equal in size
to our assumed markup of 20 percent. However, with a conservative depreciation rate of 7
percent per year and ﬁxed capacity utilization—which we induce by increasing γ2 by a factor
of 105—the optimal subsidy on capital income skyrockets to 85 percent (see line 6 of table 2).
The reason for this tremendous rise in the size of the subsidy is that the government taxes
the rate of return on capital net of depreciation, whereas the markup distorts the rate of
return on capital gross of depreciation.
Allowing for variable capacity utilization (by setting γ2 at its baseline value of 0.0685),
reduces the capital subsidy from 85 percent (line 6 of table 2) to 44 percent (line 5 of table 2).
The reason why the subsidy is smaller in this case is that a(u) is negative, which results in
a lower eﬀective depreciation rate.4
An additional factor determining the size of the optimal subsidy on capital is the ﬁscal
treatment of proﬁts. The formula given in equation (3) applies when proﬁts are taxed at a
100 percent rate. Consider instead the case in which proﬁt income is taxed at the same rate
as capital income (τ
φ
t = τk
t ), which is assumed in lines 1-4 of table 2. Because proﬁts are
pure rents, the Ramsey planner has an incentive to conﬁscate them. This creates a tension
between setting τk equal to 100 percent, so as to fully tax proﬁts, and setting τk at the
negative value that equates the social and private returns to investment. This explains why
when the Ramsey planner is constrained to tax proﬁts and capital income at the same rate,
the optimal subsidy to capital is 6.3 percent, a number much smaller than the 85 percent
implied by equation (3).
Line 7 of table 2 displays the case in which the Ramsey planner is constrained to follow




t . Not surprisingly, the
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that are optimal when the ﬁscal authority is allowed to set these tax rates separately (line
5 of table 2). The optimal rate of inﬂation under an income tax is small, half a percent
per annum, and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one that emerges when taxes can vary
across income sources. The reason why the inﬂation rate is higher than in the baseline case
is that in this way the Ramsey planner can tax labor at a higher rate than capital, a point
we discuss in detail later.
4 Ramsey Dynamics Under Income Taxation
In this section, we study the business-cycle implications of Ramsey-optimal policy when tax











for all t, where τ
y
t denotes the income tax rate.
We approximate the Ramsey equilibrium dynamics by solving a ﬁrst-order approximation
to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions. There is evidence that ﬁrst-order approximations to
the Ramsey equilibrium conditions deliver dynamics that are fairly close to those associated
with the exact solution. For instance, in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) we compute the
exact solution to the Ramsey equilibrium in a ﬂexible-price dynamic economy with money,
income taxes, and monopolistic competition in product markets. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (2004a) we then compute the solution to the exact same economy using a ﬁrst-order
approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions. We ﬁnd that the exact solution is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one based on a ﬁrst-order approximation.
It has also been shown in the context of environments with fewer distortions than the
medium-scale macroeconomic model studied here that a ﬁrst-order approximation to the
Ramsey equilibrium conditions implies dynamics that are very close to the dynamics asso-
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Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) we establish this result using a dynamic general equilibrium model
with money, income taxes, sticky prices in product markets, and imperfect competition.5
Table 3 displays the standard deviation, serial correlation, and correlation with output
of a number of macroeconomic variables of interest in the Ramsey equilibrium with income
taxation.
In computing these second moments, all structural parameters of the model take the
values shown in table 1. Second moments are calculated using Monte Carlo simulations.
We perform 1000 simulations of 200 quarters each. For each simulation, we compute second
moments and then average these ﬁgures over the 1000 simulations.
An important result that emerges from table 3 is that under the optimal policy regime
inﬂation is remarkably stable over the business cycle. This result is akin to the one derived
in the context of models with a single distortion, namely sticky product prices and no
ﬁscal considerations (Goodfriend and King, 1997 among many others). In the canonical
Neo Keynesian model studied in Goodfriend and King, the optimality of price stability is
a straightforward result. For in that environment, the single cause of ineﬃciencies is price
dispersion due to exogenous impediments to the adjustment of nominal prices. By contrast,
the medium-scale model studied here features, in addition to price stickiness, distortions
that in isolation would call for a highly volatile inﬂation rate under the Ramsey plan.
First, the fact that the government does not have access to lump-sum taxation provides
an incentive for the Ramsey planner to use unexpected variations in the inﬂation rate as a
capital levy on private holdings of nominal assets to ﬁnance innovations in the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
In eﬀect, Chari et al. (1991) show in the context of a ﬂexible-price model that the optimal
rate of inﬂation volatility is extremely high (above 10 percent per year).6 So in setting
the optimal level of inﬂation volatility, the Ramsey planner faces a tradeoﬀ between using
inﬂation as a capital levy and minimizing the dispersion of nominal prices. For plausible
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stability. For example, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) show within a sticky-price model
with distorting taxes that a miniscule amount of price stickiness suﬃces to induce the Ramsey
planner to abandon the use of inﬂation as a ﬁscal instrument in favor of virtually complete
price stability. Table 3 shows that this result survives in the much richer environment studied
here, featuring a relatively large number of nominal and real rigidities.
Second, the fact that our model features sticky wages introduces an incentive for the
Ramsey planner to adjust prices so as to bring about eﬃcient real wage movements. As will
be shown shortly, nominal wage stickiness in isolation calls for the Ramsey inﬂation rate to
be highly volatile.
With the inﬂation rate not playing the role of absorber of ﬁscal shocks, the Ramsey
planner must ﬁnance ﬁscal disturbances via deﬁcits or changes in tax rates or both. Table 3
shows that in our model the role of shock absorber is picked up to a large extent by ﬁscal
deﬁcits (i.e., by adjustments in the level of public debt). Total government liabilities, at,
are relatively volatile and display a near-unit-root behavior. The standard deviation of
government liabilities is 4.4 percent per quarter and the serial correlation is 0.99 in our
simulated sample paths. By contrast tax rates do not vary much over the business cycle.
The Ramsey planner is able to implement tax smoothing by allowing public liabilities to
vary in response to ﬁscal shocks.
4.1 Nominal Rigidities and Optimal Policy
Table 4 presents the eﬀects of changing the degree of wage or price stickiness on the behavior
of policy variables.
Panel A considers the case of no transfers (nt = 0 for all t). This case is of interest
because it removes the government’s incentive to tax transfers through long-run inﬂation,
making the economy more comparable to existing related studies. When product and factor
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(5.8 percentage points per quarter at an annual rate) and relatively stable tax rates, with
a standard deviation of 0.1 percent. In this case, as discussed earlier, variations in inﬂation
are used as a state-contingent tax on nominal government liabilities, allowing the Ramsey
planner to smooth taxes. Public debt is stationary with a serial correlation of 0.84.
When prices are sticky but wages are ﬂexible (α =0 .6 and ˜ α = 0), the optimal inﬂation
volatility falls dramatically from 5.8 percent to less than 0.1 percent. Because prices are
costly to adjust, the Ramsey planner relinquishes the use of surprise inﬂation as a ﬁscal
shock absorber. Instead, he uses variations in ﬁscal deﬁcits and some small adjustments in
the income tax rate to guarantee ﬁscal solvency. This practice results in a drastic increase
in the serial correlation in government assets, which become a (near) random-walk process.
These eﬀects of price stickiness on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy are known to emerge in
the context of models without capital and fewer nominal and real frictions (see, for instance,
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004a).
In the benchmark case, where both prices and wages are sticky (α =0 .6 and ˜ α =0 .64),
inﬂation is more volatile than under product price stickiness alone. As stressed by Erceg et
al. (2000) in the context of a much simpler model without a ﬁscal sector or capital, the reason
for the increased volatility of inﬂation in the case of both price and wage stickiness relative to
the case of price stickiness alone, is that the central bank faces a tradeoﬀ between minimizing
relative product price dispersion and minimizing relative wage dispersion. Quantitatively,
however, this tradeoﬀ appears to be resolved in favor of minimizing product price dispersion
rather than wage dispersion. In eﬀect, under price stickiness alone, the volatility of inﬂation
is 0.09 percent, whereas under wage stickiness alone it is 5.8 percent.7 When both nominal
rigidities are present, the optimal inﬂation volatility falls in between these two values, but,
at 1.1 percent, is much closer to the lower one. Interestingly, this result obtains even if
one assumes that nominal wages are not indexed to past inﬂation (˜ χ = 0). In this case, the
optimal inﬂation volatility is 0.9 percent, which is even lower than under full wage indexation
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inﬂation, being an arbitrary scheme, may not necessarily be welfare improving in our model.
Panel B of table 4 considers the baseline case of positive transfers. All of the results
obtained under the assumption of no transfers carry over to the economy with transfers.8 In
particular, it continues to be the case that inﬂation stability is the dominant characteristic
of Ramsey-optimal policy. It is of interest that the optimality of inﬂation stability obtains in
spite of the fact that nominal wages are set optimally less frequently than are product prices.
As will be clear shortly, the fact that wages are assumed to be fully indexed to past inﬂation
is not the crucial factor behind this result. Panel B of table 4 presents a further robustness
check of our main result. It displays the case in which wages are reoptimized every 8 quarters
(˜ α =0 .87) instead of every 3 quarters (˜ α =0 .64), as in the baseline calibration. In this case
the optimal inﬂation volatility is 1.8 percent. This number is higher than the corresponding
number under the baseline calibration (1.1 percent), but still relatively small.9
The reason why we pick a value of 0.87 for the parameter ˜ α in our robustness test is that
this number makes our model of wage rigidities comparable with the formulation in which
wage stickiness results in employment heterogeneity across households introduced by Erceg
et al. (2000). In eﬀect, it can shown that up to ﬁrst-order both speciﬁcations give rise to a
Phillips curve relating current wage inﬂation to future expected wage inﬂation and the wage
markup. The diﬀerence between the two speciﬁcations is that the coeﬃcient on the wage
markup is smaller in the Erceg et al. model. A value of ˜ α equal to 0.87 ensures that the
coeﬃcient on the wage markup in our model is equal to that implied by the Erceg et al.
model.10
We close this section with a digression. One may wonder why in the case of fully ﬂexible
product and factor prices and no transfers (α =˜ α = nt = 0), the Friedman rule fails to
be Ramsey optimal. The reason is that under an income-tax regime a positive nominal
interest rate allows the Ramsey planner to eﬀectively tax labor at a higher rate than capital.
The planner engineers this diﬀerential eﬀective tax rate by exploiting the fact that ﬁrms are
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planner to tax labor at a higher rate than capital is clear from our analysis of the Ramsey
steady state in the case in which labor and capital income can be taxed at diﬀerent rates
(section 3). In this case, the Ramsey planner selects to subsidize capital and to tax labor.
Under the income-tax regime studied here, the planner is unable to set diﬀerent tax rates
across sources of income. But he does so indirectly by levying an inﬂation tax on labor.
In the ﬂexible-price economy, the inﬂation bias introduced by the combination of an
income tax and a cash-in-advance constraint on wages is large, above 4 percent per year. If
in an economy without nominal rigidities and without government transfers one were to lift
the cash-in-advance constraint on wage payment by setting the parameter ν equal to zero, the
Friedman rule would reemerge as the Ramsey outcome. But the inﬂation bias introduced by
government transfers and the working capital constraint is small in an economy with sticky
prices. In eﬀect, under our assumed degree of price stickiness (α =0 .6), the steady-state level
of inﬂation falls from 0.51 percent per annum in the economy with transfers and a working-
capital constraint on wage payments to -0.19 percent in an economy without transfers and
without a working-capital constraint. We conclude that in our model, the dominant force
determining the long-run level of inﬂation is not the presence of government transfers, nor
the demand for money by ﬁrms, nor the demand for money by households, but rather the
existence of long-run frictions in the adjustment of nominal product prices.
4.2 Indexation and Optimal Policy
An important policy implication of our analysis of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in a
medium-scale model under income taxation is the desirability of price stability. Because our
benchmark calibration assumes full indexation in factor prices but no indexation in product
prices, one may worry that our central policy result may be driven too much by the assumed
indexation scheme. But this turns out not to be the case.
Consider a symmetric indexation speciﬁcation in which neither factor nor good prices are
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indexed (χ =˜ χ = 0). This case is shown in line 1 of table 5.In the non-indexed economy the Ramsey plan calls for even more emphasis on price
stability than in the environment with factor price indexation. The mean and standard
deviation of inﬂation both fall from 0.51 and 1.1, respectively, in the economy with wage
indexation to 0.11 and 0.94 in the economy without any type of indexation. The reason
why the average inﬂation rate is lower in the absence of indexation is that removing wage
indexation creates an additional source of long-run ineﬃciency stemming from inﬂation,
namely, wage dispersion. The reason why inﬂation volatility also falls when one removes
wage indexation is less clear. We simply note, as we did before, that the indexation scheme
assumed here, namely indexing to past price inﬂation, being arbitrary, may or may not be
welfare improving in the short run.
Consider now the case that prices are fully indexed but wages are not (χ = 1 and
˜ χ = 0). If our main result, namely the optimality of inﬂation stabilization, was driven by
our indexation assumption, then the indexation scheme considered now would stack the deck
against short-run price stability. Line 2 of table 5 shows that even when prices are indexed
and wages are not, the Ramsey plan calls for the same low level of inﬂation volatility as under
the reverse indexation scheme considered in the benchmark economy (line 3 of table 5). The
reason is that if the planner were to move prices around over the business cycle so as to
minimize the distortions introduced by nominal wage stickiness, then such price movements
still would lead to important ineﬃciencies in the product market because prices although
indexed are still sticky. Indexation removes the distortions associated with nominal rigidities
only in the long run, not necessarily in the short run.
The fact that indexation removes the long-run ineﬃciencies associated with nominal
product and factor price dispersion due to price stickiness is illustrated in line 4 of table 5,
displaying the case of indexation in both product and factor markets. The Ramsey-optimal
mean inﬂation rate is in this case 17 percent per year. This large number is driven by two
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to tax transfers indirectly and at the same time provides an opportunity to tax labor income
at a higher rate than capital income.
5 Optimized Policy Rules
Ramsey outcomes are mute on the issue of what policy regimes can implement them. The
information on policy one can extract from the solution to the Ramsey problem is limited to
the equilibrium behavior of policy variables such as tax rates and the nominal interest rate.
But this information is in general of little use for central banks or ﬁscal authorities seeking
to implement the Ramsey equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium process of policy vari-
ables in the Ramsey equilibrium is a function of all of the states of the Ramsey equilibrium.
These state variables include all of the exogenous driving forces and all of the endogenous
predetermined variables. Among this second set of variables are past values of the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the constraints of the Ramsey problem. Even if the policymaker
could observe the state of all of these variables, using the equilibrium process of the policy
variables to deﬁne a policy regime would not guarantee the Ramsey outcome as the com-
petitive equilibrium. The problem is that such a policy regime could give rise to multiple
equilibria.
In this section, we do not attempt to resolve the issue of what policy implements the
Ramsey equilibrium in the medium-scale model under study. Rather, we focus on ﬁnding
parameterizations of monetary and ﬁscal rules that satisfy the following 3 conditions: (a)
They are simple, in the sense that they involve only a few observable macroeconomic vari-
ables; (b) They guarantee local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium; and (c)
They minimize some distance (to be speciﬁed shortly) between the competitive equilibrium
they induce and the Ramsey equilibrium. We refer to rules that satisfy criteria (a) and (b)
as implementable. We refer to implementable rules that satisfy criterion (c) as optimized
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rules.11We deﬁne the distance between the competitive equilibrium induced by an implementable
rule and the Ramsey equilibrium as follows. Let IRR
T,S,Y denote the impulse response function
associated with the Ramsey equilibrium of length T quarters, for shocks in the set S, and
variables in the set Y . Similarly, let IRCE
T,S,Y denote the impulse responses associated with
the competitive equilibrium induced by a particular policy rule. Let x ≡ vec(IRR
T,S,Y −
IRCE
T,S,Y). Then, we deﬁne the distance between the Ramsey equilibrium and the competitive
equilibrium associated with a particular implementable rule as x0x.
An alternative deﬁnition of the distance between the competitive equilibrium induced
by an implementable rule and the Ramsey equilibrium is given by the diﬀerence in the
associated welfare levels. This deﬁnition of an optimized rule is equivalent to selecting
policy-rule coeﬃcients within the set of implementable rules so as to maximize the level of
welfare associated with the resulting competitive equilibrium. We adopt this deﬁnition in
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004c,e). In general, a policy rule that is optimal under this
deﬁnition will not coincide with the one that is optimal according to criteria (a), (b), and
(c). It is clear, however, from the quantitative welfare analysis reported later in this section
that the gains from following such a strategy in lieu of the one adopted here are small.
In the present analysis, we take as reference the Ramsey equilibrium under the restric-
tion of an income tax. We compute impulse response functions from a ﬁrst-order accurate
approximation to the Ramsey and competitive equilibria. We set the length of the impulse
response function at 20 quarters (T = 20). The set of shocks is given by the three shocks
that drive business cycles in the model presented above, productivity, government consump-
tion, and government transfers shocks. That is, S = {zt,g t,n t}. Finally, we include in the
set Y 17 endogenous variables. Up to ﬁrst order, all variables listed in the deﬁnition of a
competitive equilibrium given in the expanded version of this paper can be obtained as a
linear combination of the elements of the sets Y and S. Of course, adding variables to the
set Y would not be in general inconsequential, for it would amount to altering the weights
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be clear from the discussion that follows, expanding the set Y or altering the weights given
to each individual variable would result at best in negligible welfare gains.
The family of rules that we consider here consists of an interest-rule and a tax-rate rule.
In the interest-rate rule, the nominal interest rate depends linearly on its own lag, the rates
of price and wage inﬂation, and the log deviation of output from its steady state value. The
tax-rate rule features the tax rate depending linearly on its own lag and log deviations of
government liabilities and output from their respective steady-state values. Formally, the



















The target values R∗,π∗,y∗,τy∗, and a∗ are assumed to be the Ramsey steady-state values
of their associated endogenous variables, given in the second column of table 3. The variable
πW
t ≡ Wt/Wt−1 denotes wage inﬂation. It follows that in our search for the optimized policy
rule, we pick 7 parameters so as to minimize the Euclidean norm of the vector x containing
1020 elements. We set the initial impulse equal to 1 standard deviation of the innovation in
the corresponding shock. That is, for impulse responses associated with shocks zt, gt, and
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April 2006The optimized interest-rate rule turns out to be passive, with the sum of the product-
price and wage inﬂation coeﬃcients less than unity. Under this rule, variation in aggregate
activity do not trigger a monetary policy response, as can be seen from the fact that the
output coeﬃcient is close to zero. The optimized monetary rule exhibits interest rate inertia
implying long-run reactions to deviations of inﬂation from target twice the size of the short-
run response.
The optimized tax-rate rule calls for a mute response to variations in output or govern-
ment liabilities. In addition, it is superinertial with a coeﬃcient on lagged tax rates of about
2. In equilibrium, this rule induces tax rates that are virtually constant over the business
cycle.
5.1 Welfare Under the Optimized Rule
We measure the welfare cost of a particular monetary/ﬁscal policy speciﬁcation vis ` a vis the
Ramsey policy as the increase in consumption needed to make a representative consumer
indiﬀerent between living in an economy where the particular monetary/ﬁscal policy con-
sidered is in place and an economy where the government follows the Ramsey policy. The
welfare cost is computed conditional on the initial state of the economy being the deter-
ministic steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium.12 In computing welfare costs, we solve the
model up to second-order of accuracy. In particular, we use the perturbation method and
computer algorithm developed in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004d).
Applying this deﬁnition to evaluate the welfare cost of following the optimized policy
rules given in equations (4) and (5) instead of implementing the Ramsey-optimal policy, we
obtain a cost of 0.017 percent of the Ramsey consumption process. Using ﬁgures for personal
consumption expenditures per person in the United States in 2003, the welfare cost amounts
to 4.42 dollars per person per annum.
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To provide a sense of how close the dynamics induced by the Ramsey policy and the optimized
rule are, in this section we present theoretical impulse responses to the three shocks driving
business cycles in our model economy. Figure 1 displays impulse response functions to a
one-standard-deviation increase in productivity (lnz1 =1 .2 percent). Solid lines correspond
to the Ramsey equilibrium, and broken lines correspond to the optimized policy rules.
Remarkably, in response to an increase in productivity, hours worked fall (indeed more
than one for one). The reason for this sharp decline in labor eﬀort is the presence of signiﬁ-
cant costs of adjustment in investment and consumption. Notice that neither consumption
nor investment move much on impact. As a result, the increase in productivity must be
accompanied by an increase in leisure large enough to ensure that output remains little
changed on impact. The contraction in hours following a positive productivity shock is in
line with recent econometric studies using data from the U. S. economy (see, for example,
Gal´ ı and Rabanal, 2004).
The equilibrium dynamics of endogenous nonpolicy variables induced by the optimized
policy rules mimic those associated with the Ramsey economy quite well. Surprisingly, these
responses are induced with settings for the policy variables that are remarkably diﬀerent from
those associated with the Ramsey equilibrium. In particular, the response of the income tax
rate is virtually ﬂat in the competitive equilibrium whereas under the Ramsey policy tax rates
increase sharply initially and then quickly fall to below-average levels. At the same time, the
Ramsey planner responds to the productivity shock by tightening money market conditions,
whereas the policy rule calls for a signiﬁcant easing. It follows that the initial deceleration in
inﬂation is a not a consequence of the monetary policy action—which is expansionary—but
rather a reaction to forces that are ﬁscal in nature. In eﬀect, the optimized rule leaves the
income tax rate unchanged. At the same time output is expected to increase, so that the
expected value of tax revenues increases. As a result a higher level of government liabilities
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boost the real value of outstanding government liabilities.
Figures 2 and 3 display impulse responses to a government spending shock and a govern-
ment transfer shock, respectively.
In both cases, the size of the initial impulse equals one standard deviation of the shock
(3.2 percent for the government spending shock, and 3.5 percent for the government transfer
shock). The equilibrium dynamics under the optimized policy rule appear to mimic those
associated with the Ramsey policy not as closely as in the case of a productivity shock. This
is understandable, however, if one takes into account that these two shocks explain only a
small fraction of aggregate ﬂuctuations. In eﬀect, productivity shocks alone explain over
90 percent of variations in aggregate activity under the Ramsey policy. The optimization
estimation procedure therefore naturally assigns a smaller weight on ﬁtting the dynamics
induced by gt and nt.
5.3 Ramsey Policy With A Single Instrument
In this section we ask how optimal policy changes if the government is restricted to setting
optimally either monetary or ﬁscal policy but not both. Of course, the answer to this
question may in principle be sensitive to the details of the policy that is assumed to be set
non optimally.
We consider two cases. In one, ﬁscal policy is set optimally, while the monetary authority
follows a simple Taylor rule with an inﬂation coeﬃcient of 1.5, that is, Rt/R =( πt/π)1.5.
Here, the parameters R and π correspond to the steady-state values of Rt and πt in the Ram-
sey equilibrium with optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy. We pick this particular speciﬁcation
for monetary policy because it has been widely used in related empirical and theoretical stud-
ies. The other policy regime we consider is one in which monetary policy is determined in
a Ramsey optimal fashion but ﬁscal policy consists in keeping real government liabilities
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at in the Ramsey equilibrium with optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy. Our choice of ﬁscal
policy in this case is motivated by the fact that in most existing studies of monetary policy
it is typically assumed implicitly or explicitly that the ﬁscal authority ensures ﬁscal solvency
under all possible (equilibrium and oﬀ-equilibrium) paths of the price level.
Table 6 displays second moments of endogenous variables of interest and welfare of the
representative agent conditional on the initial state being the Ramsey steady state with
optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy.
The economy with nonoptimal ﬁscal policy is signiﬁcantly more volatile than the economy
with nonoptimal monetary policy. The reason is that in the economy with nonoptimal
ﬁscal policy the government is forced to adjust tax rates over the business cycle so as to
ensure constancy of real public liabilities. Higher volatility of real variables, however, is not
associated with lower welfare. On the contrary, the welfare cost of not being able to conduct
optimal monetary policy are much larger than the welfare cost of not being able to conduct
optimal ﬁscal policy.
6 Capital and Labor Taxation
In this section, we characterize dynamic Ramsey policy under the assumption that the ﬁscal
authority has access to three tax instruments, taxes on capital income (τk
t ), taxes on labor
income (τh
t ), and taxes on pure proﬁts (τ
φ
t ). Clearly, the optimal tax rate on proﬁts is 100
percent. We thus set τ
φ
t = 1 for all t for the remainder of the section.
We analyzed the Ramsey steady state of this economy earlier in section 3. As shown on
line 5 of table 2, in the Ramsey steady state the labor income tax rate is 38.2 percent and the
capital subsidy is 44.3 percent. For the calibration shown in table 1, we ﬁnd that the standard
deviation of the capital income tax rate under the Ramsey policy is 148 percent. The natural
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taxes should be less than 100 percent will be frequently violated and in this regard the
optimal policy makes little economic sense.13 Qualitatively, however, the intuition for why
the volatility of the capital income tax is high is clear. Because capital is a predetermined
state variable, unexpected variations in the capital income tax rate act as a nondistorting
levy, which the ﬁscal authority uses to ﬁnance innovations in the government budget. The
(population) serial correlation of capital tax rates is very close to zero at -0.07. When
capital income tax rates can play the role of a ﬁscal shock absorber, government liabilities
no longer display the near random walk behavior as in the case of an income tax. In fact,
the (population) serial correlation of at now is only 0.6.
To put the number we obtain for the optimal volatility of τk
t into perspective, we use as
a point of reference two simpler but related economies. First, Chari et. al. (1995), study
optimal taxation in a standard real-business-cycle model with exogenous long-run growth
and report a standard deviation of the capital income tax rate of 40 percentage points for
the stochastic steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium.14
The second economy we study as a point of reference is a stationary version of the RBC
model of Chari et al. (1995). We ﬁnd that if one assumes no long-run growth in the Chari et
al. economy, the standard deviation of capital income taxes shoots up to about 60 percent
(assuming that the level of government assets in the steady state is the same as in the
economy with growth). This result illustrates that relatively minor modiﬁcations in the
economic environment can lead to drastic changes in the optimal volatility of capital income
tax rates. Still, these values are not as high as the ones we ﬁnd in our much more complex
model economy. In what follows we complete the reconciliation of our ﬁnding with those
available in the existing literature.
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Two modiﬁcations to our medium-scale macroeconomic model allow us to drive the optimal
volatility of capital tax rates down to a level that is comparable to the one that obtains in
the standard real business cycle model without growth. First, the model studied by Chari
et al. features no impediments to adjusting the level of investment over the business cycle,
whereas our model economy incorporates signiﬁcant investment adjustment costs. Lowering
the investment adjustment cost parameter κ by a factor of 1,000 reduces the optimal capital
income tax volatility from 148 percent to 66 percent which is close to the volatility of the RBC
model without growth. If in addition we assume that tax rates are set one period in advance,
then the optimal capital tax volatility falls to 20 percent. The reason why adjustment costs
induce a higher optimal volatility of the capital income tax is that investment adjustment
costs make capital more akin to a ﬁxed factor of production thereby making movements in
the capital tax rate less distorting.
Second, the time unit in the Chari et al. model is one year. By contrast, the time unit
in our model is one quarter. Our choice of a time unit is guided by the fact that we study
optimal monetary policy as well as optimal ﬁscal policy. It is unrealistic to assume that the
government adjusts monetary policy only once a year. For example, in the United States
the FOMC meets every 8 weeks. At the same time, it is equally unrealistic to assume that
tax rates change every quarter. One possible way to resolve this conﬂict is to continue to
assume that the time unit is one quarter and to impose that tax rates are determined several
quarters in advance, that is, that there are tax lags.
Figure 4 depicts the standard deviation of the capital income tax as a function of the
number of tax lags.
It shows the results for the economy calibrated using the parameter values shown in
table 1. The graph illustrates that the optimal volatility of the capital income tax rate falls
steadily with the number of tax lags. Under the assumption that tax rates are determined
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percentage points. This level of volatility is lower than the values obtained in a non-growing
RBC model.
6.2 Capital Tax Volatility and Cost of Varying Capacity Utiliza-
tion
Another diﬀerence between the simple RBC model of Chari et al. (1995) and the model
studied here, is that our model economy incorporates variable capacity utilization. One may
think that the presence of variable capacity utilization could induce lower capital income tax
volatility. For in this case the eﬀective stock of capital is no longer predetermined. As a result,
one would expect that variations in the capital income tax rate should be more distorting
and hence used less. It turns out, however, that the volatility of the capital income tax rate
is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected when the cost of varying the intensity of capacity utilization falls
(in our model, when γ2 is reduced). For example, when we hold γ1 constant and reduce γ2
by a factor of 2, the optimal capital tax volatility increases from 149 percent to 153 percent.
7 Conclusion
We study Ramsey-optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in a medium-scale model of the U.S.
business cycle. The model features a rich array of real and nominal rigidities that have
been identiﬁed in the recent empirical literature as salient in explaining observed aggregate
ﬂuctuations.
We ﬁnd that price stability appears to be a central goal of optimal monetary policy. The
optimal rate of inﬂation under an income tax regime is half a percent per year with a standard
deviation of 1.1 percent. This result is somewhat surprising given that the model features a
number of frictions that in isolation would call for a volatile rate of inﬂation—particularly
nonstate-contingent nominal public debt, no lump-sum taxes, and sticky wages.
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a standard deviation of 1.1 percent around a mean of 30 percent. In addition, the Ramsey
outcome features a near random walk in real public debt. Taken together, these results
suggest that shocks to the ﬁscal budget are ﬁnanced neither through surprise inﬂation (as in
models with ﬂexible nominal prices), nor through adjustments in the income tax rate, but
rather through variations in the ﬁscal deﬁcit. It follows that the Ramsey equilibrium has
little resemblance to a world operating under a balanced-budget rule.
We show that simple monetary and ﬁscal rules implement a competitive equilibrium that
mimics well the one induced by the Ramsey policy. These rules bring about welfare levels
that are virtually identical to the ones associated with the Ramsey policy. The optimized
interest-rate rule is passive, in the sense that the inﬂation coeﬃcient is less than unity, and
features a mute response to output and a mild degree of interest-rate inertia. At the same
time, the optimized ﬁscal-policy rule is acyclical, in the sense that tax rates do not respond
to changes in either output or the level of public debt. The ﬁscal rule is super inertial, with a
coeﬃcient on the lagged tax rate of about 2. Thus, for example an increase in taxes today is
expected to be followed by further tax increases in the future. In equilibrium, this property
of the ﬁscal rule renders tax rates virtually constant over the business cycle.
When the ﬁscal authority is allowed to tax capital and labor income at diﬀerent rates,
optimal ﬁscal policy is characterized by a large capital subsidy of over 40 percent with an
enormous volatility of about 150 percent. The introduction of four quarters of time to tax
brings this volatility down to 50 percent. While signiﬁcant, this decline leaves the Ramsey-
optimal capital-income-tax volatility impractically large.
The present study could be extended in a number of directions. One is to allow for a
richer set of underlying shocks. Altig et al. (2004), for instance, allow for an additional
productivity shock that is speciﬁc to the investment sector. Also, Smets and Wouters (2004)
estimate a model with 10 shocks. Additionally, one could assume that the shocks driving
business cycles are nonstationary, as in Altig et al. (2004). These extensions are of interest
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the exogenous shocks generating aggregate ﬂuctuations. A word of caution, however, is in
order before taking this route. In econometrically estimated versions of the model studied
in this paper (or variations thereof), it is often the case that a large number of shocks is
estimated as a byproduct. A number of these shocks are diﬃcult to interpret economically.
In eﬀect, these shocks, to a large extent, represent simple econometric residuals reﬂecting
the distance between model and data. A case in point are shocks to Euler equations or
uncovered interest parity conditions. Before incorporating this type of residual as driving
forces, it is perhaps more productive to give theory a chance to get closer to the data.
Possibly the most urgent step in this research program, however, is to characterize credible
policy in large macroeconomic models. The Ramsey plans derived in the present study are
time inconsistent, in the sense that at each point in time, a social planner that cares about
the welfare of people from that moment on, has incentives to abandon promises made from
a timeless perspective. In the past two decades, a growing literature in macroeconomics
has been focusing on game-theoretic approaches to policy making. This literature focuses
on identifying credible punishment schemes by the public should the government default on
its policy promises. The aim is to ﬁnd credible policies that maximize welfare. Thus far,
applications of this line of research to ﬁscal and monetary policy has been limited to highly
stylized, small-scale models. Extending the study of credible monetary and ﬁscal policy to
large-scale models would be an important milestone for the theory of stabilization policy.
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1Examples of this line of research include Ireland (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), Woodford (2003), and Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999), among many others.
2A formal analytical derivation of the result that the Friedman rule fails in the presence
of government transfers is given in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2005a).
3The model presented in Judd can be alternatively interpreted as one where the depre-
ciation rate is positive and the production function represents output net of depreciation.
Under this interpretation, however, Judd’s measure of the markup would not be directly
comparable to ours.
4To see why the level of capacity utilization ut is less than one (which is necessary for
(a(ut)) to be negative) in the Ramsey equilibrium, recall that in the competitive equilibrium
used for the calibration of the function a(·), the tax rate on capital was set at 40.7 percent
and ut was set at unity. In the Ramsey equilibrium, τk is negative, which induces a larger
level of capital. With a higher capital stock, its rate of return at full utilization falls, which
induces capitalists to lower it degree of utilization. In the steady state shown in line 5 of
table2, u equals 0.85.
5More recently, Benigno and Woodford (2005) arrive at a similar conclusion in the context
of optimal taxation in the standard RBC model. They show that the ﬁrst- and second-order
approximations of the Ramsey equilibrium conditions are similar to the approximation based
on a minimum-weighted-residual method reported in Chari et al. (1995).
6To the best of our knowledge, Chari et al. (1991) represents the ﬁrst quantitative demon-
stration that the Ramsey rate of inﬂation in a ﬂexible-price economy is highly volatile and
unforecastable. However, the idea that surprise inﬂation is a tax on the stock of outstand-
ing nominal government liabilities and that as a result the Ramsey rate of inﬂation should
have dynamic properties akin to the Ramsey capital-income tax rate has been articulated
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by Turnovsky and Brock (1980), Judd (1992), and Calvo and Guidotti (1990,1993).7The result that inﬂation volatility rises signiﬁcantly when product prices are allowed to
be ﬂexible but wages are sticky is sensitive to the battery of shocks driving business cycles.
Chugh (2005) shows that when the sole source of uncertainty is innovations in government
spending, then the Ramsey outcome implies low inﬂation volatility when prices are ﬂexible
but wages are sticky. Indeed, in our model, when prices are ﬂexible but wages are sticky, the
volatility of inﬂation is 5.8 percent in the environment with productivity and government
spending shocks but only 0.3 percent in an environment with only government purchases
shocks. The intuition for why adding productivity shocks increases the optimal volatility of
inﬂation when prices are ﬂexible and wages are sticky, stems from the fact that in response
to productivity shocks, the real wage tends to move more than in response to government
spending shocks and that the role of inﬂation is to bring real wages closer to their eﬃcient
level. It follows that the high volatility of inﬂation in the case of sticky wages and ﬂexible
prices is not ﬁscal in nature.
8One exception is the fact that the mean rate of inﬂation increases dramatically when
product prices are ﬂexible. As discussed earlier in section 3.1, the reason why the Ramsey
planner chooses to inﬂate when all prices are ﬂexible, is that inﬂation is an indirect tax on
transfer payments.
9Under this higher level of wage stickiness and price ﬂexibility (i.e., ˜ α =0 .87 and α = 0),
the optimal inﬂation volatility is 7.8 percent. On the other hand, under sticky prices and
ﬂexible wages (i.e., ˜ α =0a n dα =0 .6), the optimal inﬂation volatility is 0.2 percent. Hence,
when price stickiness takes its baseline value but wage stickiness is higher than in the baseline
case (i.e., ˜ α =0 .87 and α =0 .6), the inﬂation volatility is closer to the ﬁgure associated
with product-price rigidity alone.
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t+1−κˆ ˜ µt, where πW
t ≡ Wt/Wt−1 denotes wage inﬂation and ˜ µt denotes the wage markup.
The diﬀerence between our approach to modeling the labor market and the one adopted in
Erceg et al. (2000) is the size of the parameter κ. Under our speciﬁcation, we have that κ =
κSGU ≡ (1− ˜ α)(1− ˜ αβ)/˜ α. The Erceg et al. speciﬁcation implies that κ = κSGU/(1+EHL),
where EHL is a positive constant.
11A further criterion one could impose is that the nominal interest rate not violate the zero
bound. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004c), we approximate this constraint by requiring
that in the competitive equilibrium the standard deviation be less than a fraction of the
steady-state value of the nominal interest rate.
12A formal derivation of this welfare cost measure is presented in the expanded version of
this paper (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2005b).
13Our computational strategy does not allow us to consider the case that tax rates are
bounded above and below explicitly. But even if one were to use an alternative computational
method, one should ﬁnd that Ramsey capital income tax rates vary signiﬁcantly over the
business cycle.
14Chari et. al. consider an annual calibration (that is somewhat diﬀerent from the one
considered here) with business cycles driven by government purchases and technology shocks.
Recently, Benigno and Woodford (2005) using a diﬀerent numerical technique replicate this
ﬁnding. As a test of our numerical procedure, we also study this economy and are able to
reproduce the numbers reported in Benigno and Woodford.
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10Formally, the wage-inﬂation Phillips curve can be written up to ﬁrst order as ˆ πW
t =Table 1: Structural Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.9902 Subjective discount factor (quarterly)
θ 0.25 Share of capital in value added
ψ 0.0594 Fixed cost
δ 0.0173 Depreciation rate (quarterly)
ν 0.5114 Fraction of wage bill subject to a CIA constraint
η 6 Price-elasticity of demand for a speciﬁc good variety
˜ η 21 Wage-elasticity of demand for a speciﬁc labor variety
α 0.6 Fraction of ﬁrms not setting prices optimally each quarter
˜ α 0.64 Fraction of labor markets not setting wages optimally each quarter
b 0.65 Degree of habit persistence
φ1 0.0267 Transaction cost parameter
φ2 0.1284 Transaction cost parameter
φ3 1 Preference parameter
φ4 0.75 Preference parameter
κ 2.48 Parameter governing investment adjustment costs
γ1 0.0339 Parameter of capacity-utilization cost function
γ2 0.0685 Parameter of capacity-utilization cost function
χ 0 Degree of price indexation
˜ χ 1 Degree of wage indexation
¯ g 0.0505 Steady-state value of government consumption (quarterly)
¯ n 0.0232 Steady-state value of government transfers (quarterly)
ρz 0.8556 Serial correlation of the log of the technology shock
σ￿z 0.0064 Std. dev. of the innovation to log of technology
ρg 0.87 Serial correlation of the log of government spending
σ￿g 0.016 Std. dev. of the innovation to log of gov. consumption
ρn 0.78 Serial correlation of the log of government transfers
σ￿n 0.022 Std. dev. of the innovation to log of gov. transfers
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t χ ¯ nγ 2 πRτ h τk proﬁt share
τk
t 0.2 4.2 35.4 -6.3 0.6
τk
t 1 4.6 8.8 34.7 -6.6 0.6
τk
t 10 -3.8 0 24.1 -5.3 2.3
τk
t 0 -0.2 3.8 23.3 -5.2 2.3
1 0.3 4.3 38.2 -44.3 0.8
1 6850 0.3 4.3 37.8 -84.9 1.4
τk
t ,τh
t 0.5 4.5 30.0 30.0 0.3
Note: The inﬂation rate, π, and the nominal interest rate, R, are expressed in
percent per year. The labor income tax rate, τh, and the capital income tax rate,
τk, are expressed in percent. Unless indicated otherwise, parameters take their
baseline values, given in table 1.
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Variable Steady Standard Serial Correlation
state deviation correlation with output
τ
y
t 30 1.1 0.62 -0.51
Rt 4.53 1.43 0.74 -0.11
πt 0.51 1.1 0.55 0.11
yt 0.3 1.96 0.97 1
ct 0.21 1.16 0.98 0.89
it 0.04 7.87 0.98 0.95
ht 0.19 1.34 0.75 0.59
wt 1.17 0.94 0.93 0.80
at 0.72 4.44 0.99 0.31
Note: Rt and πt are expressed in percent per year, and τ
y
t is expressed in percent.
The steady-state values of yt, ct, it, wt, and at are expressed in levels. The
standard deviations, serial correlations, and correlations with output of these 5
variables correspond to percent deviations from their steady-state values.
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A. No Transfers (nt =0 )
α ˜ ατ
y
t Rt πt wt at
Mean 19.0 4.4 0.4 1.2 0.8
0 0 Std. dev. 0.1 0.2 5.8 1.4 2.5
Ser. corr. 0.6 0.8 -0.1 0.8 0.84
Mean 19.0 4.0 0.02 1.2 0.8
0.6 0 Std. dev. 0.4 0.7 0.1 1.4 6.3
Ser. corr. 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.9 1
Mean 19.0 4.4 0.4 1.2 0.8
0 0.64 Std. dev. 1.5 3.1 5.8 1.7 5.1
Ser. corr 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.99
Mean 19.0 4.0 0.02 1.2 0.8
0.6 0.64 Std. dev. 1.0 1.3 1.1 1 3.6
Ser. corr. 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.99
B. Baseline Transfers
Mean 27.5 21.2 16.6 1.2 0.7
0 0 Std. dev. 0.5 0.5 6.8 1.5 3.0
Ser. corr. 0.4 0.9 -0.0 0.8 0.84
Mean 30.0 4.5 0.5 1.2 0.7
0.6 0 Std. Dev. 0.6 0.9 0.2 1.3 7.0
Ser. corr. 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.7 1
Mean 27.5 21.2 16.6 1.2 0.7
0 0.64 Std. dev. 1.3 4.6 6.6 1.9 4.3
Ser. corr. 0.5 0.9 0.83 0.8 0.99
Mean 30 4.5 0.5 1.2 0.7
0.6 0.64 Std. dev. 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.9 4.4
Ser. corr. 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.99
Mean 30 4.5 0.5 1.2 0.7
0.6 0.87 Std. dev. 2.0 1.4 1.8 0.9 3.7
Ser. corr. 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.99
Note: See note to table 3.
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χ ˜ χτ
y
t Rt πt wt at
Mean 30 4.1 0.11 1.2 0.72
0 0 Std. dev. 0.66 1.2 0.94 1 4.9
Ser. corr. 0.56 0.6 0.44 0.96 0.99
Mean 30 4.1 0.13 1.2 0.72
1 0 Std. dev. 0.66 1 1.1 1.1 5
Ser. corr. 0.51 0.58 0.77 0.96 0.99
Mean 30 4.5 0.51 1.2 0.72
0 1 Std. dev. 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.95 4.3
Ser. corr. 0.62 0.74 0.55 0.93 0.99
Mean 28 21 17 1.1 0.74
1 1 Std. dev. 1 2.7 2.9 1.2 4
Ser. corr. 0.47 0.88 0.94 0.96 1
Note: See note to table 3.
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Standard Deviation Serial Correlation
Variable Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal
Monetary & Fiscal Fiscal Monetary Monetary & Fiscal Fiscal Monetary
Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy
τ
y
t 1.09 0.71 1.74 0.62 0.93 0.85
Rt 1.43 2.25 1.4 0.74 0.53 0.53
πt 1.1 1.5 1.33 0.55 0.53 0.55
yt 1.98 1.74 2.5 0.97 0.97 0.98
ct 1.17 1.1 1.52 0.98 0.97 0.99
it 8.01 6.88 10.6 0.98 0.99 0.99
ht 1.34 1.13 1.96 0.75 0.80 0.87
wt 0.96 1.07 0.99 0.94 0.9 0.9
at 4.43 6.28 0 0.99 1 0
Welfare Cost $0.00 $9.10 $2.30
Note: In the case of optimal ﬁscal policy only, monetary policy takes the form
of a Taylor rule, Rt/R =( πt/π)1.5 (in this formula, we use the notation used in
the exposition of the paper, so that Rt and πt are expressed in gross quarterly
rates), where R and π denote, respectively, the steady-state values of Rt and πt
in the Ramsey equilibrium with optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy. In the case
of optimal monetary policy only, ﬁscal policy consists in keeping real government
liabilities constant, that is, at = a, where a denotes the steady-state value of at in
the Ramsey equilibrium with optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy. The variables
Rt and πt are expressed in percent per year, and τ
y
t is expressed in percent. The
standard deviations and serial correlations of output, consumption, investment,
hours, wages, and government liabilities correspond to percent deviations from
their steady-state values. The welfare cost is measured in dollars of 2003 per
person per year and is deﬁned as the compensation needed to make the repre-
sentative agent indiﬀerent between living in a world with the policy indicated in
the respective column heading and living in a world where both monetary and
ﬁscal policy are Ramsey optimal.
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April 2006Figure 1: Impulse Response To A Productivity Shock

























































Ramsey Policy Optimized Rule
Note: The size of the initial innovation to the technology shock is one standard
deviation, ln(z1)=1 .2%. The nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate are
expressed in percent per year, the tax rate is expressed in percentage points,
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April 2006Figure 2: Impulse Response To A Government Spending Shock
























































Ramsey Policy Optimized Rule
Note: The size of the initial innovation to the government spending shock is one
standard deviation, ln(g1/¯ g)=3 .2%. The nominal interest rate and the inﬂation
rate are expressed in percent per year, the tax rate is expressed in percentage
points, and the remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations from
their respective steady-state values.
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April 2006Figure 3: Impulse Response To A Government Transfer Shock


























































Ramsey Policy Optimized Rule
Note: The size of the initial innovation to the government spending shock is one
standard deviation, ln(n1/¯ n)=3 .5%. The nominal interest rate and the inﬂation
rate are expressed in percent per year, the tax rate is expressed in percentage
points, and the remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations from
their respective steady-state values.
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April 2006Figure 4: Time to Tax and Capital Tax Rate Volatility
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 (in percent per qtr.)
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